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COMMERCIAL SPEECH-AN END IN SIGHT
TO CHRESTENSEN?
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,1 the United States Supreme Court held that a municipal human relations ordinance, 2 which prohibited a newspaper from publishing its
help-wanted classified advertising under sex-designated column headings, did not abridge freedom of speech -and press. 3 The case reinforces
the prevailing view that commercial speech is not fully protected by
the first amendment. This note will examine the Court's traditional approach to governmental abridgement of commercial speech, will -analyze
the treatment of commercial speech in Pittsburgh Press and will propose
that the Court no longer exclude commercial speech from first amendment protection merely because of the commercial nature of the expression.
The litigation which culminated in the Pittsburgh Press opinion began
on October 9, 1969, when the National Organization for Women, Inc.
(NOW) filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (Commission). NOW alleged in its complaint that the Pittsburgh
Press Company (Pittsburgh Press) violated the Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh 4 by "[a]llowing employers to place adver1. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

2. See note 4 infra.
3. Pittsburgh Press also argued that the Ordinance violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment since there was no rational connection between
sex-designated column headings and sex discrimination in employment. The Court
summarily rejected this argument. 413 U.S. at 381 n.7.
4. PITTSBURGH, PA., ORDINANCES § 8 (1967), as amended, PITrSBUROH, PA.,
DINANCES § 20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ORDINANCES] provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice. . . except where based upon

OR-

a bona fide occupational exemption certified by the Commission ....
(a) For any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise discriminate against any person with respect to hiring .. . because of ...
sex ....
(e) For any "employer," employment agency or labor organization to
publish or circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice

or advertisement relating to "employment" or membership which indicates
any discrimination because of. . .sex. ...

1258

19741

CASE NOTES

1259

tisements in the male or female columns, when the jobs advertised obviously [did] not have bona fide occupational qualifications or exceptionS5 . ...
6 The Commission found the complaint to set forth probable cause that Pittsburgh Press violated the Ordinance. Following the
procedures specified in the Ordinance, 7 the Commission, on January 15,
1970, commenced public hearings at which NOW, Pittsburgh Press and
other interested organizations" presented their evidence and arguments.
On July 23, 1970, the Commission issued a decision and order" finding

-that in 1969 Pittsburgh Press published help-wanted advertisements in
sex-designated columns' 0 at the direction of the advertisers. If an adver(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency
or labor organization, to aid, incite, compel, coerce or participate in the
doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice by this
ordinance ....
The complaint filed against the Pittsburgh Press "charge[d] the Pittsburgh Press
with deliberate and constant violations of Section 8(j) .....
Complaint of NOW,
reprinted in Appendix to the Brief for Appellant at 4a.
5. The Ordinance applies to employers employing five or more employees and
specifically exempts "any religious, fraternal, charitable or sectarian organization
which is not supported in whole or part by any governmental appropriation." ORDINANCES § 4(c).
6. Complaint of NOW, reprinted in Appendix to the Brief for Appellant at 4a.
7. ORDINANCES § 13 provides:
(e) If the Commission determines after investigation that probable
cause exists for the allegations made in the complaint, it may attempt to
eliminate the unlawful practice by means of private conferences or meetings with all parties ...
(g) In any case of failure to eliminate the unlawful practice charged in
the complaint by means of informal proceedings . . .the Commission may

hold a public hearing to determine whether or not an unlawful practice
has been committed ....
8. The Allegheny County Conference on Civil Rights, the National Association
of Women Lawyers, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the
Women's Equity Action League appeared as amici curiae on behalf of complainant,
NOW, while the American Newspaper Publishers Association appeared as amicus
curiae for the Pittsburgh Press. Brief for Appellee at 3.
9. The Commisssion's Decision and Order is reprinted in the Appendix to the
Petition for Certiorari at la-18a.
10. The Pittsburgh Press labeled its "help-wanted" columns "Male Help Wanted,"
"Female Help Wanted," and "Male-Female," until October 1969 when it began using
the headings "Jobs-Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest," and "Male-Female," together with a "Notice to Job Seekers":
Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience of our readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal more
to persons of one sex than the other. Various laws and ordinances-local,
state and federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because of sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement
itself specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should assume that the ad-
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tiser did not specify whether it desired a male or female for the advertised
job the Pittsburgh Press would ask the advertiser its preference. The
Commission ruled that Pittsburgh Press violated the Ordinance 1 by aidig the advertisers "'to cause to be published . . .advertisement[s] relating to 'employment' . . .which indicate[d] . . . discrimination because
of . . . sex.' 2 The Pittsburgh Press was ordered to cease and desist
from violating the Ordinance by eliminating all references to sex in its
13
classification of help-wanted advertising.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, on March 24,
1971, affirmed the order of the Commission, 14 and on January 27, 1972,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania modified the order to allow
references to sex in the column headings for employment advertising exempt under the Ordinance or certified by the Commission to be exempt
because of a bona fide occupational qualification. 15 On June 21, 1972,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied appeal. 16
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
'Powell,17 affirmed. The Court held that the newspaper's editorial judgment in allowing advertisers to classify help-wanted advertisements,
merges with the advertisements themselves into an "integrated commercial statement" which is unprotected by the first amendment. The unprotected status especially applies when the commercial activity proposed by
the advertisements (i.e. employment discrimination) "is illegal and the
restriction on advertising [is] incidental to a valid limitation on economic
activity."' 8 The Court also decided that no prior restraint existed since
"the order [was) based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct
vertiser will consider applicants of either sex in compliance with the laws
against discrimination.
413 U.S. at 379, 381 n.7.
11. The Commission specifically held that the Pittsburgh Press violated ORDINANCES § 8(j). 413 U.S. at 380.
12. ORDINANCES § 8(e).

13. 413 U.S. at 379-80.
14. Brief for Respondents at 6. The opinion of the Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County is reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari at
19a-45a.
15. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa.
Cmwlth. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
16. Brief for Respondent at 7.
17. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Rehnquist joined with the majority
opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Blackmun filed
dissenting opinions.
18. 413 U.S. at 389.
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. [and] the order [was] clear and [swept] no more broadly than

[was] necessary."19

Not only is Pittsburgh Press significant because it validates an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from publishing sex-classified help-wanted
advertisements, 20 but it is also significant as one of the few Supreme
Court opinions to discuss the first amendment impact on governmental
abridgement of commercial speech. Pittsburgh Press is the first Supreme
Court opinion to uphold content regulation of commercial newspaper advertisements under the doctrine that "purely commercial speech" is not
entitled to the protection of the first amendment.

However, the Court's

opinion contains significant dictum that commercial advertisements, in
some situations, may serve first amendment interests which could prevail
when balanced against the governmental interest in regulation. 2' Such
a recognition of the first amendment interests represented by commercial
speech, if formally adopted by the Court, 22 would mark a departure from
the traditional doctrine that purely commercial speech is not protected
by the first amendment.

Early Supreme Court opinions 23 upholding governmental regulation of
19. Id. at 390. This note will focus on the protection of commercial speech under the first amendment aspect of the Court's holding. For a discussion of the prior
restraint aspect of this case see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV.
55, 158-60 (1973).
20. Cf. National Org. for Women v. Gannett Co., Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 107,
338 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1972), and National Org. for Women v. Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 917, 337 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1972) holding that a newspaper publishing help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns must intend
to participate in unlawful discriminatory conduct to violate N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296
(McKinney 1972), a human relations law similar to the Pittsburgh Ordinance. See
also Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal.
1970), a/I'd, 469 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973) and
Greenfield v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 4 E.P.D. § 7763 (N.D. Ill. 1972) holding that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970) prohibiting sex discriminating advertisements, only applies to employers, labor organizations and employment agencies and that newspapers were not intended by Congress to be included in the term "employment agency." For a general discussion of legal attacks
against sex discrimination in "help-wanted" advertising see Boyer, Help-Wanted Advertising-Everywomen's Barrier, 23 HASTINGs L. REv. 221 (1971).
21. 413 U.S. at 389.
22. Justice Douglas considers commercial speech to be within the scope of the
first amendment. 413 U.S. at 397-98 (dissenting opinion); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15 (1959) (dictum) (concurring opinion); and Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971) (dissenting to denial of certiorari).
See also Lehman v. City of Shake Heights, 42 U.S.L.W. 5116, 5121 n.6 (U.S. June
26, 1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) upholding a Utah statute
which forbade advertising of cigarettes and other tobacco products on billboards.
The Court did not discuss whether this statute violated the first amendment but sustained the statute against equal protection, due process and commerce clause challenges. In Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911), the Court
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commercial advertising side-stepped the issue of whether commercial advertising was protected "speech." It was not until 1942, in Valentine
v. Chrestensen,2 4 that the Court distinguished "purely commercial advertising" from "information and opinion" which is entitled to the full protection of the first amendment. Chrestensen charged the public an admission fee to tour his submarine exhibit in New York City and was arrested
distributing handbills advertising the attraction. The police charged him
with violating a section of the municipal sanitary code which prohibited
the distribution of advertising handbills on the streets. 25 The Court held

the municipal ordinance did not unconstitutionally abridge freedom of
press and of speech. 26 Yet, while the Court limited the first amendment
protection of commercial speech, the Court did not adequately define
commercial speech, nor indicate what protection, if any, it should be
given.

The Chrestensen standard to determine whether the expression was

"purely commercial advertising" has been subsequently labeled the "pri-

mary purpose test."'27 Chrestensen attempted to circumvent the New
York City Sanitary Code by distributing a double-faced handbill: on one

side was the submarine exhibit advertisement and on the reverse side was
a protest against the city for not allowing him to exhibit his submarine

at a municipal pier.

Focusing on Chrestensen's intent, the Court con-

cluded that the protest was employed on the reverse side solely to evade
upheld a New York City ordinance prohibiting exterior advertising on motor vehicles against equal protection and contract clause challenges. See also Head v. New
Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963) holding constitutional a statutory prohibition
of price advertising by optometrists where the first amendment issue was not properly raised; Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) reaffirming the holding of Fifth Ave.
24. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
25. Id.
26. Id. In Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Court held
that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of "any hand-bill" ".alongor
upon any street" violated the first amendment. Since the Court in Christensen upheld a similar law which applied solely to advertising matter, the Court did not consider advertising entitled to the full protection of the first amendment. See also
discussion by Justice Frankfurter in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276-77
(1951) (concurring opinion).
27. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 451 (1971). See also
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HA.v. L. REV. 1005, 1028
(1967):
[T]he Supreme Court has made use of a crude 'main purpose' test to determine the category within which the questioned activity should fall, but this
test provides no measure of the extent to which the function of the first
amendment demand that a particular expression be free from a particular
regulation,
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the ordinance, and thus not entitled to first amendment protection. 28 The
Court did not elaborate on the applicability of this test beyond the limited
situation where one includes traditionally protected speech on an advertisement solely to avoid regulation of the advertisement.
The second question raised by Chrestensen-the extent of first amendment protection, if any, given -to "purely commercial advertising"-involves the scope of the first amendment. 29

It is difficult to find the ans-

wer from a reading of Chrestensen since the opinion, written by Justice
Roberts, is quite brief and gives no decisions or analysis to support its
holding. The opinion merely states that
the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states
and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public
interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these
public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.8 0
Federal 3 ' and state3 2 courts have interpreted this language to mean that

".purely commercial advertising" is not entitled to any first amendment

28. 316 U.S. at 55.
29. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877 (1963) and Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
Or. REV. 245 for discussions on the scope of the first amendment by two preeminent
first amendment theorists.
30. 316 U.S. at 54.
31. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (1971) holding, inter
alia, that SEC Rule 10b-5, interpreted to prohibit mere negligence in the issuance
of a corporate press release did not violate the first amendment since "the First
Amendment deals with the free exchange of ideas and not with commercial 'factual'
speech (citing Chrestensen)." In Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88, 96-97 (D.R.I.
1972) the court in discussing a naval air station's commanding officer restricting
commercial activities within the housing area of the air station stated that "the restrictions on such activities involves neither the denial of any constitutional right nor
the exercise of a peculiarly military authority. Commercial speech is not protected
by the first amendment (citing Chrestensen) .... ." The court in Patterson Drug
Co. v. Kingerly, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969), in upholding a Virginia
statute prohibiting drug retailers from advertising price and terms of sale of prescription drugs stated that the "regulation of commercial advertising does not intrude
upon First Amendment rights of free speech." See also United States v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d
1371, 1379-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Brazhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450,
456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1952);
Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 132 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'd mem.,
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
32. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 57, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 430, 434, 434 P.2d 982, 986 (1967) holding unconstitutional as a violation
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These courts have extended Chrestensen beyond its facts and

explicit holding that states can prohibit, for the purpose of preventing litter, the distribution of advertising handbills on public streets, and have
cited Chrestensen as authority for excluding commercial advertising from
first amendment protection. 38

A minority of federal3

4

and state3

5

courts

of the first amendment a public transit district's policy of accepting commercial
and political election advertisements while rejecting all other political and controversial advertisements. The court found this policy to reverse "acceptable priorities"
and to "perversely give preference to commercial advertising over nonmercantile
messages" since "[a] long line of decisions has established the rule that commercial messages do not come within the orbit of the First Amendment and may be
regulated or prohibited by the Government in the same manner as other business
affairs (citing Chrestensen)"; Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326,
346, 225 A.2d 728, 739 (1966) upholding a state statute prohibiting pharmacists
from advertising prices of prescription drugs. In response to the pharmacist's claim
that the statute violated the first amendment freedom of speech the court responded
that "[sluch [first amendment] guaranties impose no such restraint upon governmental regulation of purely commercial advertising (citing Chrestensen)"; Bigelow v.
Virginia, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 909 (1973), upholding a conviction of a local newspaper publisher for "encourag[ing] or prompt[ing] the procuring of abortion" by publishing an advertisement for out-of-state legal abortions. Relying on Chrestensen, the court held that "the First Amendment
imposed no restraint upon proscription by states and localities of purely commercial
advertising . . ." ; HM Distrib. of Milwaukee v. Dep't of Agriculture, 55 Wis. 2d

261, 272-73, 198 N.W.2d 598, 605 (1972) upholding state department of agriculture
rules prohibiting the promoting of a "chain distributor scheme" not violative of freedom of speech since "[the United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional protection afforded free speech does not apply to commercial advertising (citing Chrestensen) .... " See also In re Philpie, 82 Nev. 215, 414 P,2d 949 (1966).
33. See notes 31 and 32 supra and cases cited therein.
34. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aI!'d, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), discussing the first amendment protection afforded commercial advertising while upholding a statute, 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1970), which prohibits pandering advertisements in the mails. The court stated that "[tihe commercial element [of the advertisement] does not altogether destroy its quality as protected speech, but it does substantially reduce the weight of the expression on constitutional scales." The court found that the public interest represented by the regulation perdominated over the first amendment interest furthered by the advertisement especially since "to the commercial element [of the advertisements] there
[was] added a peculiar quality of offensiveness which adheres to solicitations appealing to the erotic interest." See also Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
35. In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946), where, in holding
unconstitutional a statute requiring a license to professionally solicit members for
labor unions, the court stated that
it cannot be said that the safeguards of the First Amendment . . . are

wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity. In the last analysis
the extent of permissible regulation of business or economic activity depends upon the balancing of social interests and the facts of any given
case.
28 Cal. 2d at 102, 168 P.2d at 713 (citations omitted).
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have limited Chrestensen to its narrow holding that public streets are not
a protected forum for the dissemination of advertising matter. These
courts have proceeded with a balance of interest analysis rather than follow the Chrestensen approach, which classifies the communication as un36
protected "purely commercial advertising.1
Jamison v. Texas, 37 involved a Chrestensen type anti-litter ordinance,
which also restricted the distribution of advertising matter. Ms. Ella
Jamison, a Jehovah's Witness, distributed handbills touting a religious lecture, and also soliciting contributions, in return for which the donors
would receive religious books.38 Finding Jamison's purpose in distributing the handbills to be the "pursuit of a clearly religious activity" the
Court distinguished the facts from Chrestensen and reversed the conviction.3 9 Chrestensen was further distinguished in decisions reversing Jeho40
vah's Witnesses' convictions for refusing to pay a municipal solicitor's tax
and for violating an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills by
41
ringing doorbells.
In 1951, the Court faced a case falling between the extremes of the
unprotected commercial purpose of Chrestensen and the protected religious purpose of Jamison. In Breard v. Alexandria,42 a magazine subscription peddler was arrested for violating a municipal ordinance which
prohibited solicitors from entering private property without the invitation
of the occupants. The Court, balancing the privacy rights of the homeowner against the right of a large magazine subscription service to canvas
from house-to-house, (and considering the rights of non-objecting home43
owners) -rejected the first amendment argument of the solicitor.
Significantly, Breard did not attempt to define magazine soliciting as
"purely commercial speech"; instead, the regulation of commercial speech
was upheld by a balancing test weighed in the favor of privacy. The
Breard approach illuminates a deficiency in Chrestensen: first amendment interests represented by "purely commercial advertising" 44 were not
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See notes 34 and 35 supra and cases cited therein.
318 U.S. 413 (1943).
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 417.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

41.

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

42. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
43. Id. at 641-45.
44. Justice Douglas, dissenting to the Court's denial of certiorari in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971), commented on the first amendment interests furthered by commercial speech:
The language of the First Amendment does not except speech directed at
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explicitly considered by the Chrestensen Court in determining the validity
of the governmental regulation. If Breard had followed Chrestensen and
classified the solicitation as "purely commercial speech," the same decision would have been obtained but without evaluation of the first amendment interests furthered by the magazine solicitation.
Another deficiency in the Chrestensen approach is the difficulty in
classifying communications as "purely commercial speech."' 4 5 In the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, the Court had no problem finding that the activity represented more than "purely commercial speech" by examining
the primary purpose of the Witnesses, which was to engage in protected

religious activity. 46 Regarding regulation of newspaper advertising, the primary purpose test could lead to restrictions since the newspaper publishes
Thus, in
advertisements for the primary purpose of financial gain.4
newspaper cases, the primary purpose test is inadequate since the Court
has held that even though newspapers, 4 8 books, 49 and movies50 are proprivate economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important than political expression. When immersed in a
free flow of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking is at
least as effective an institution as are our various governments infurthering the social interest in obtaining the best general allocation of resources.
Id. at 905. Commentators have also articulated the first amendment interests furthered by commercial speech:
The assumption has been made . . . that speech promoting the sale of

commercial services and products does not relate to interests served by the
first amendment . ... [Clommercial advertising does, in fact serve those
interests. By providing the consuming public with information, commercial speech aids in the attainment of society's goal of intellectual self-fulfillment and, more importantly, helps the individual to rationally plan his
life to achieve the maximum satisfaction possible within the reach of his
resources. In so doing it serves an important function as a catalyst in the
achievement of personal self-realization.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429, 472
(1971).
45. See, e.g., New Left Educ. Proj. v. Board of Regents, 326 F. Supp. 158 (W.D.
Tex. 1970); Wolfe v. City of Albany, 189 F. Supp. 217, 221 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
For examples of the "large grey area in which it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between so-called commercial activity and speech entitled to full constitutional
protection," see Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45
N.Y.U.L. REV. 761, 769 (1970).
46. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142-43 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417
(1943).
47. The theoretical basis for the primary purpose test is weakest when the test
is applied to advertisements appearing in publications produced by organizations motivated by a desire to maximize their profits since a viable free press needs an independent financial base, independent of the government. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
48. Id.
49. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
50. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
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duced for the primary purpose of financial profit, they are not excluded
from the protection of the first amendment.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5' supplanted the primary purpose test.
Evaluating the first amendment interests furthered by the content of an
advertisement, the Sullivan Court determined that a particular advertisement was not "purely commercial speech." The Committee to Defend
Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South submitted
an advertisement to the Times which described Southern civil rights activities and criticized public authorities of certain Southern communities.
A coupon soliciting contributions to further the work of the Committee
appeared in the advertisement. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel suit against the Times as
publishers of the advertisement. To counter the argument of the New
York Times that the first amendment protected the advertisement from
libel suits, Sullivan argued "that the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech and of the press [were] inapplicable . . .because the allegedly

libelous statements were published as part of a paid, 'commercial' advertisement." 5 2 The Court answered Sullivan's argument, stating that
"[t]he publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense
in which the word was used in Chrestensen."' 3 Abandoning the primary
purpose test of Chrestensen-Jamison and formulating criteria which
examine content, the Court found that since the advertisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement
whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
and concern," 5 4 the advertisement was not "purely commercial speech."
If courts must follow the Chrestensen approach of classifying certain
advertisements as unprotected "purely commercial speech," the content
test is a more preferable method of classification than the primary purpose test.5 5 As illustrated by Sullivan, certain first amendment interests
embodied in commercial expression can be weighed when the content of
51.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

52. Id. at 265.
53. Id. at 266.
54.

Id.

55. Commentators have been critical of the primary purpose test when used by
the Court to determine whether a particular expression is "purely commercial
speech," unprotected by the first amendment.

"[The primary purpose] test provides

no measure of the extent to which the functions of the first amendment demand
that a particular expression be free from a particular regulation."

Developments in

the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1028 (1967).
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the advertisement is examined by the court.5" If the primary purpose
test were applied to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan -the advertisement
would have been classified as "purely commercial speech" and hence unprotected.
Decisions subsequent to Chrestensen and prior to Pittsburgh Press indicated a reluctance to follow the Chrestensen approach of upholding governmental regulation of commercial expressions without analyzing the first
amendment interests represented by the commercial speech. 57 Nevertheless, the PittsburghPress Court failed to deal the death-blow to Chrestensen, and instead classified the help-wanted advertisements as "classic examples of commercial speech." 58s Using the Sullivan content test, the
Court found that the help-wanted advertisements did not state
a position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought
to be filled by members of one or the other sex nor [did] any of them
criticize the Ordinance or the Commission's enforcement practices,59

but instead were "purely commercial speech" as distinguished from Sullivan protected speech. The newspaper's editorial judgment merges with
The difficulty with the use of the primary purpose test is that it makes
little sense, either theoretically or practically. If it is acknowledged that
an important aspect of the first amendment right is the listeners interest
in acquiring knowledge of the existence of financial motives on the part
of the speaker would seem irrelevant.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 452
(1971).

[A] motive test raises unmanageable problems of definition.

Moreover,

whose motive should be determinative-the author's, publisher's or distributors? A more fundamental defect of a motive's distinction is that it is
irrelevant to the reasons why social, religious or political expression is protected.
Note, Freedom of Speech in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1203
(1965).
56. The primary purpose test is more restrictive than the content test since the
former classifies as "purely commercial speech" all advertisements made for the primary purpose of financial gain while the latter gives first amendment protection to
advertisements created by non-commercial authors who delegate to a profit motivated organization the task of disseminating the advertisement. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The content test is still objectionable
since it does not directly allow consideration of the first amendment right of the
public to information. For a discussion of the first amendment protection afforded
the right to receive information and ideas, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969).
57. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 735-38
(1970); Ginsberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474-76 (1966); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178,
189-92 (1948). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66
(1964).
58. 413 U.S. at 385.
59. Id.
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the advertisements themselves to form "an integrated commercial statement." 60 The Court also discounted the petitioner's argument that
commercial speech should be accorded a higher level of protection than
Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest [since] . . . the exchange of
information is as important in the commercial realm as in any other
.. .61

Instead the Court indicated that it did not specifically hold that all "classic
examples of commercial speech" are unprotected by the first amendment.
While the Court Tejected the petitioner's argument here, it left future
cases to decide what "the merits of this contention may be in other contexts . . ." which do not involve advertisements aiding illegal economic

activity such as discrimination.6 2 The Court suggested that the proper
approach would be to balance "[a]ny First Amendment interest which
. . .
might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal
'6 3
[against] the governmental interest supporting the regulation.
On the other hand, PittsburghPress did not specify the extent to which
"purely commercial speech" is protected by the first amendment when
the advertisements do not propose illegal commercial activity. In Pittsburgh Press, the commercial speech lacked significant first amendment interests and the balancing test was not used to uphold the regulation. The
adoption of the content test in Sullivan6 4 and the balancing language in
Pittsburgh Press6" indicate an unwillingness by the Court to interpret
Chrestensen as giving rise to a talismanic exclusion of "purely commercial
speech" from the protection of the first amendment.
When one argues that commercial speech is unprotected by the first
amendment, one is forced to say that commercial speech does not represent any first amendment interests. 6 6 Commercial speech must be distin60. Id. at 388.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 388-89. Although the Court found that the advertisements solicited
a "commercial activity [which was] . . . illegal" (i.e. discrimination in employment) and was "no differen[t] in principle" from "a want ad proposing a sale of
narcotics or soliciting prostitutes" the Court was unwilling to base its decision that
the Pittsburgh Press was not protected by the first amendment solely on the illegality furthered by the advertisements. Had the Court fully accepted the analogy
to the narcotics and prostitution advertisements it would have been unnecessary to
rely on the commercial speech doctrine of Chrestensen. CI. Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (dictum); Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York
Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
63. 413 U.S. at 389.
64. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
65. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
66. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969):
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guished from classes of expression such as obscenity, 67 recklessly made
libelous statements, 68 solicitations of crime,6 9 incitements of violent overthrow of the government 70 and fraudulent assertions 71 which are excluded
72
from first amendment protection because of their inherent offensiveness.
In these situations the government has the power to proscribe the substantive evil which by definition emanates from the expression,78 and
74
which places the expression outside the scope of the first amendment.
When the expression falls into an inherently offensive class, the Court
begins its analysis with a declaration that the class of expression is not
protected by the first amendment and proceeds to determine whether the
expression falls within the proscribed class and therefore can be regulated
consistent with the first amendment. This approach is inapplicable to
"purely commercial speech," since commercial speech is not inherently of78
fensive.
The government can constitutionally regulate commercial speech even
though commercial speech, as a class, should not be excluded from the
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of
the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. . . . [I]t does not affect the political process, does not contribute to the exchange of ideas, does
not provide information on matters of public importance, and is not, except
perhaps for the ad-men, a form of individual self-expression.
But see note 44 supra.
67. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Cf. California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109 (1972).
68. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. See cases cited in T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 600 (3d ed. 1967).
70. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
71. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
72. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. .

.

. Such utterances . . . are of such slight social value as a step

to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighted by the social interest in order and morality.
73. The Supreme Court generally does not require that the expression, containing inherently offensive elements, create a "clear and present danger" that a substantive evil will occur. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973). But cf. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). See generally McKay,
The Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182, 1203-12 (1959).
74. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
75. While this approach is not applicable to the class, commercial speech, it is
applicable to that commercial speech which does contain inherently offensive elements. See discussion at note 89 infra.
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protection of the first amendment. The Supreme Court has rejected the
absolutists' position that the first amendment prohibits, without exception,
all laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 76 Through
the years, the Court has used the "bad tendency test," 77 the "clear and
present danger test," 78 and the "ad hoc balancing test" 79 to uphold laws
limiting freedom of speech and press. A rejection of the Chrestensen doctrine of excluding commercial speech from the protection of the first
amendment would raise the issue of how the first amendment interests
furthered by commercial advertising are to be reconciled with the governmental interests supporting the regulation of commercial speech.
The governmental regulation of commercial advertising for the stated
purpose of limiting economic activity represents a collision between the
first amendment interests furthered by the advertising, the right of consumers to information needed to conduct their economic affairs, and the
governmental interest in limiting economic activity. The Court has generally upheld governmental limitations of economic activity if the limitation is reasonably related to a valid governmental purpose.80 This policy
of giving the legislatures wide latitude in the area of economic regulation8l led to the adoption of the Chrestensen doctrine. The Court in
Chrestensen stated:
Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a deroga82
tion of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.

The first amendment, which prohibits laws abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press precludes this "mere rationality test" as a standard
88
for evaluating regulations limiting expression.
76. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
77. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). But cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395 (1950).
78. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). For a history
of the "clear and present danger test," from its beginnings to its demise see Linde,
"Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Strong, Fifty years of "Clear and Present Danger":
From Schenck to Brandenburg--andBeyond, 1969 Sup. Cr. REV. 41.
79. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
80. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). But cf. United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
82. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
83. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943).
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Recently, the Supreme Court has applied a definitional balancing test
to determine the scope of the first amendment.8 4 The definitional balancing test which "draws the constitutional line generically, by determining the meaning of constitutional guarantees for different classes of situa,tion[s]"85 is significantly different than the ad hoc balancing test which
"decid[es] whether the interest of a particular litigant in freely expressing views which the judge may consider loathsome, dangerous, or ridiculous is outweighed by society's interest in 'order,' 'security,' or national
'self-preservation.' "86 Professor Strong has proposed that, in free speech
controversies, the Court apply the definitional balancing test coupled with
a renovated clear and present danger test requiring that "legislation and
equivilant forms of articulated government policy . . .bear such a close
and immediate nexus to valid objectives beyond the reach of the first
amendment -that there is no danger of jeopardy to the value protected by
that amendment. 8 7 This two stage approach could be used by the Court
to resolve first amendment challenges to regulations of advertising content.
The first stage of Professor Strong's approach requires that the Court
define, using a balancing process, for the class of expression before the
Court, the portion of the class which is protected speech. An example
of this definitional balancing can be found in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan"8 where the Court, confronted with the class-libelous statements-drew the line for protected speech between negligently and recklessly made false statements. The definitional balancing test can be used
to determine the demarcation point between protected and unprotected
speech for various classes of commercial speech. The classes of commercial speech can be determined by the subject matter of the challenged
regulation. Laws restricting the content of advertising are either directed
at general inherently offensive advertising such as false,89 deceptive, 90
84. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
85. Strong, supranote 78, at 64.
86. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1434-35
(1962).
87. Strong, supra note 78, at 75.
88. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
89. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 157.21a (Supp. 1973); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 2911.41 (Page 1973).
See generally Barnes, False Advertising, 23 OHIo
ST. L.J. 597 (1962).
90. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). See generally Developments in the
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967). For a discussion of
the Federal Trade Commission's role in combatting deceptive advertising, see Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1269
(1966).
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fraudulent, 91 or obscene advertising, 92 or advertising of a particular product or service such as food and drugs, 93 alcoholic beverages, 94 securities, 95
or legal services. 96 For purposes of the definitional balancing test, the
classes could be constructed along similar lines. For the inherently offensive classes of advertising, the Court would balance the first amendment value of the particular class against the governmental interest in the
regulation. Since less weight may be afforded the commercial expression,
the Court in balancing could determine that the line between protected
and unprotected speech be drawn at a different point than for the same
type of offensive but non-commercial expression.
For the product-service classes of advertising, the Court could also define the constitutionally protected speech within the class. The greater
-the potential for harm arising from the particular product or service, the
less constitutional protection would be afforded the advertising. Expressed another way, the greater the governmental restrictions on the sale
of the product or service, the less protection accorded to the advertising.
Once the class of advertising is broken down between protected and unprotected speech, the second stage of Professor Strong's approach is the
determination that the governmental regulation be "closely and intimately" connected to a valid governmental objective determined by the
stage one definitional balancing test. If the governmental regulation of
advertising is drafted so as to affect only advertising which, by definitional
balancing is excluded from the protection of the first amendment, there
would be no problem in determining that a close nexus exists between
the governmental regulation and a constitutionally permissible state objective. On the other hand, if the governmental regulation of advertising
limits advertising entitled to constitutional protection "it would be selfevident that no tight nexus could possibly be demonstrated between the
91. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
92. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.5 (West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-20(a)(6) (Supp. 1973).
93. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). For a critical
discussion of restrictions on retail drug price advertising, see Note, Retail Drug Advertising Bans Are Bad Medicine For Consumers-Is There a Sherman Act Prescription, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 117 (1973). See also Recent Decisions, A Statute
Which Prohibits the Advertising of Prescription Drug Prices isUnconstitutional, 37
BROOKLYN L.REV.617 (1971).
94. E.g., 27 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
95. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1970).
96. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.165 (Supp. 1972). See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2, EC 2-9 (1969).
For the argument that the
first amendment compels liberalization of the current restrictions on advertising of
legal services, see Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
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applicable state law and a constitutionally permissible objective of the
97
state."1
Applying Professor Strong's approach to Pittsburgh Press, one must
determine to what extent help-wanted advertising is, protected by the
first amendment. Accepting Professor Emerson's four functions of a system of freedom of expression-to assure "individual self-fulfillment," advance "knowledge and discover truth, . ..

provide for participation in

decision making by all members of society," and achieve "a more adapt8
able and hence a more stable community" 9S-the
first amendment interests furthered by help-wanted advertising become evident. Help-wanted
advertising provides job seekers with employment information and aids
in the attainment of suitable employment, thus indirectly contributing to
individual self-actualization. Arguably, by being employed the individual
will be more able to participate in the decision-making processes of society. Help-wanted advertising not serving these first amendment interests can not be protected. Hence, help-wanted advertising which aids
employment discrimination must be excluded from first amendment
"speech" since it effectively retards individual self-fulfillment and participation in the decision-making procedures---both preferred first amendment interests.
Once help-wanted advertising which aids sex discrimination is found to
lay outside the scope of the first amendment, it is obvious that a "close
and intimate nexus" exists between the Pittsburgh Ordinance and the
valid governmental purpose of preventing advertising furthering employment discrimination by sex. Thus, the same result reached by the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Press could have been obtained by disregarding
,the "commercial speech doctrine" and by relying upon an approach which
adequately provides for the possible first amendment interests represented
by commercial advertisements.
Regulations primarily directed at the manner of dissemination of the
advertisements, 99 however, require a different analysis. Whether such a
regulation abridges freedom of expression depends in many instances on
whether the advertiser has alternative forums available to disseminate his
information. 10 Since the constitutionality of the regulation is dependent
upon factors peculiar to the individual case, the most appropriate analysis
97.

Strong, supra note 78, at 78.

98.
99.

T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
An example of such a regulation is discussed in Comment, Billboard Regulations, and Aesthetics, 21 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 194 (1972).

100. Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

with Martin v. City
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for this group of regulations is the ad hoc balancing test.10 1 In following
this test "the court must, in each case, balance the individual and social
interest in freedom of expression against the social interest sought by the
regulation which restricts expression."'10 2 Courts should consider whether
could be served by using a less
the governmental purpose in regulation
03
onerous alternative restriction.
By applying the definitional balancing test for content regulations and
the ad hoc balancing test for medium regulations, courts can determine
whether governmental restrictions on advertising unduly encroach upon
freedom of speech and press. But because of Chrestensen, the majority
of federal and state courts consider "purely commercial advertising" outside the scope of the first amendment. Until ,the Supreme Court explicitly rejects the broad interpretation of Chrestensen, many courts will continue summarily dismissing first amendment challenges to governmental
regulation of advertising, even though the consumers' right to information
is in jeopardy.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not seize upon the opportunity presented by Pittsburgh Press to renounce Chrestensen. Although
the language of Pittsburgh Press is ambiguous, it can still be read as support for excluding commercial advertisements from first amendment protection. On the other hand, the PittsburghPress Court, while mentioning
Chrestensen, did look beyond the commercial nature of the help-wanted
advertisements to justify upholding the human relations ordinance. The
Court expressed two other justifications: the commercial activity proposed
by the advertisements was illegal and the restriction on the advertising
was "incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity."'10 4 A reasonable inference can be drawn from Pittsburgh Press that the commercial
nature of an expression can not be the sole basis for excluding commercial advertisements from first amendment protection. Accepting this interpretation of Pittsburgh Press the present Court will explicitly reject the
Chrestensen doctrine if given the proper opportunity.
Bradford E. Block

101.
102.

See note 79 supra.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.

877, 912 (1963).
103. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan,
J., concurring). See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE LJ. 464 (1969).

104.

413 U.S. at 389.

